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BOOK REVIEWS
WARREN: THE MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA. By John D. Weaver.
Boston: Little Brown & Company. 1967. Pp. 406. $7.95.
Warren: the Man, the Court, the Era is a rather straightforward
account of the life of the two personalities named Earl Warren
and his relationship to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The author presents the life of this dual personage within the con-
text of local, State, and national politics since World War I.
The first Earl Warren was born in 1891 in Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia. His family later moved to Bakersfield, California, where
he attended Kern County High School. Subsequently, he studied
6 years at the University of California at Berkeley, earning a bache-
lor of laws degree in 1912, and a doctor of laws degree in 1914.
After 3 years in the practice of law, first with a corporation and
later with a firm, he went into the Army as a private. Discharged
at the end of the war as a first lieutenant, Earl Warren obtained a
job as a deputy in the Alameda County (California) District Attor-
ney's Office. He was appointed chief deputy in 1923, and district
attorney in 1925 (for the balance of an unexpired term). "[Bly
meeting and talking to more voters than any other candidate had
ever talked to before,"' he won election to that office in 1926. In
1938, he sought and won election to the post of attorney general
of California and in 1942 was elected Governor of the State. He
served in this latter position until 1953.
The second Earl Warren came into being on September 30,
1953, immediately after the announcement that he had been ap-
pointed Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. From
this point in time, his life is undoubtedly well known to the readers
of this review.
It is difficult to account for the apparent differences between
the two public personalities. Warren the district attorney and
attorney general fought criminals and Communists with every
means the law allowed, but with ever an eye to the sometimes ex-
treme mood of the electorate. Warren the Chief Justice, however,
has been called the friend of the criminal because of his position
on civil liberties and individual rights. He has also been the tar-
get of a half-serious attempt at impeachment by the John Birch
I J. WEAVER, WARREN: THE MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA 43 (1967), quoting
from I. STONE, EARL WARREN: A GREAT AMERICAN STORY 56 (1948).
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Society and has been hanged in effigy three times. Yet, through-
out his entire life, Earl Warren has always had "a passionate com-
mitment to law and order."
After reading the life of this man as reflected in his accom-
plishments, it is clear that Earl Warren the district attorney and
attorney general would have reacted to a given situation with a re-
sponse quite the opposite to that of Earl Warren the Chief Justice.
But this reviewer is thoroughly convinced that the visceral reaction of
both personalities is the same. For example, it is not difficult to
imagine how Justice Warren would react to an order, by the Presi-
dent and the Congress, to evacuate all Japanese-Americans from
the west coast, as was done in 1942. Here is how Earl Warren the
attorney general reacted:
A few weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Earl Warren
stated that he had "come to the conclusion that the Japanese sit-
uation as it exists ... today, may well be the Achilles' heel of the
entire civilian defense effort."'
Three days later he said: "It seems to me that it is quite sig-
nificant that in this great state of ours we have had no fifth-col-
umn activities and no sabotage reported. It looks very much to
me as though it is a studied effort not to have any until the zero
hour arrives."3
And later, when asked about the civil rights of the evacuees,
California's attorney general replied: "I believe, sir, that in time
of war every citizen must give up some of his normal rights."4
And during the war he stated:
If the Japs are released no one will be able to tell a saboteur
from any other Jap. We are now producing approximately half
of the ships and airplanes of the country on the Pacific Coast. To
cripple these industries or the facilities that serve them would be
a body blow to the war effort. We don't want to have a second
Pearl Harbor in California. We don't propose to have the Japs
back in California during this war if there is any lawful means
of preventing it.5
Yet, despite his earlier remarks, when the War Department
announced that the internment order was rescinded as of January
2, 1945, Governor Warren was one of the first to call upon Cali-
2 j. WEAVER, supra note 1, at 105, quoting from M. GRoDzlNs, AMERICANS
BETRAYED: POLITICs AND THE JAPANESE EVACUATION 94 (1949).
3 j. WEAVER, supra note 1, at 105, quoting from M. GRoDzINS, supra note 2, at
94.
4 J. WEAVER, supra note 1, at 108 (footnote omitted).
r Id. at 109 (footnote omitted).
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fornians to "join in protecting constitutional rights of the individ-
uals involved."6  His official statement went on to declare:
Any public unrest that develops from provocative statements or
civil disturbances that result from intemperate action will of neces-
sity retard the flow of needed materials to our boys in the Pacific
who are moving steadily but at great sacrifice toward their ulti-
mate goal - Tokyo.
... As civilians, it is our duty to comply with such decisions
as loyally and cheerfully as they do
For its nature, the book is well done. It has all the apparatus
of solid research and scholarship: over 30 pages of notes, merci-
fully placed in the back and not cluttering each page; a table of
cases that appears to include most of the landmark decisions; and
a pretty fair index. I would call this book a compilation biogra-
phy; hundreds of quotations from a myriad of sources are tied to-
gether with a minimum of comment and analysis. The author,
John D. Weaver, is well suited to this task, having spent 5 years
on the Kansas City (Mo.) Star. Since 1940, he has been a free-
lance writer of short stories and articles for many of the leading
magazines. To his literary credit are two novels, two works of
nonfiction, and one juvenile book.
The book is interesting reading in small doses; the subject is
important for anyone who desires to place the decisions of the Su-
preme Court in the context of the personalities of its members.
DAVID S. LAKE*
HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT. Edited by Stephen P.
Strickland. New York: Bobbs-Merrill 1967. Pp. xxix, 365.
$10.00.
The editor of this work is a graduate of Emory University, holds
a M.A. from Johns Hopkins, and is presently studying for his Ph. D.
there. Professor Charles L. Black of Yale writes a foreword to the
work's nine chapters, each written by a different author. In the
back of the book there are notes to each chapter, a table of cases,
and an index. Greatly to the credit of the editor, the topics are well
61d. (footnote omitted).
7 Id. at 109-10 (foomote omitted).
* Member of the Ohio Bar and the United States Court of Customs.
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planned and there is a minimum of repetition from chapter to chap-
ter.
Although Hugo Black is a member of my All-American Su-
preme Court,1 and although I have enjoyed reading this book, it
should not surprise you that I do not think it begins to do justice to
its subject. I would be less than honest were I not to say that it
fails to present a balanced portrait. Granting that a symposium
makes this somewhat inevitable, nevertheless, there are too many
laudatory chapters that lack critical appraisal. Some of the chapters
are incomplete in coverage, concentrating on the great decisions for
which we all admire Mr. Justice Black, and yet omit, or merely note,
the hard cases. For example, there is no mention of Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins' and no notice, except briefly, of Yamashita v.
Styer8 and Korematsu v. United States.4  Further, such discussion
as there is of Black's fourth amendment views is completely out of
date in light of his recent dissent in Berger v. United States.'
Professor Carl Brent Swisher of Johns Hopkins, biographer of
Field and Taney, writes -the first chapter, "History's Panorama and
Justice Black's Career." As history it is interesting. Senator Black
voted against confirmation of Hughes as Chief Justice, argued that
F.D.R. had a right to pack the Court, and demanded that the Court
expedite decisions as to constitutionality. During the New Deal,
World War II, and the McCarthy Era, he pictures Black as a loner,
dissenting 16 times during the 1937 term, 12 alone, and in Stone's
doghouse because of his "somewhat cavalier way of dealing with
precedents and questions not fully argued .... ."
However, when Swisher comes to the modern Court, I fear there
is too much of the old school tie. While Swisher admirably recog-
nizes that, if "ours is to be a living Constitution,"7 then the Supreme
Court, sitting "as a kind of continuing Constitutional Convention '"8
must adapt the document to changing conditions. He, never-
*This book review, in a somewhat shorter version, originally appeared in 54
A.B.A.J. 293 (1968).
1 Keeffe, Practicing Lawyers' Guide to the Current Law Magazines, 52 A.B.A.J. 981
(1966).
2 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8 377 U.S. 1 (1946).
4 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
G 388 U.S. 41, 71 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
6 Swisher, History's Panorama and Justice Black's Career, in HuGO BLACK AND
THE SUPR0 COURT 36 (S. Strickland ed. 1967).
7Id. at 23.
8Id.
19681
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19: 806
theless, complains that the Court's decisions, and Black's in particu-
lar, "sometimes read like fiat determinations made without refer-
ence either to documented history or to clearly expressed principle."9
This lets Swisher have it both ways; his reader, neither, and damns
Black with faint praise.
In chapter 2, former Yale Professor John P. Frank, law clerk to
Mr. Justice Black at the 1942 term, author of a book entitled Mr.
Justice Black: The Man and His Opinions," and now a practicing
lawyer in Phoenix, Arizona, writes with respect to Black as a New
Dealer. It is stimulating and provocative writing, especially the
discussion of his former boss's attitude towards substantive due proc-
ess and the application of the antitrust laws to small business and
patents. Apparently when Martin Van Buren of the O.K. Demo-
crat Club of Kinderhook, New York, appointed Peter V. Daniel to
the Supreme Court, he wrote Andy Jackson "that he had made that
choice because he wanted to choose a Democrat 'ab ovo' - from
the egg."" In Frank's opinion, when F.D.R. selected Hugo "he
wanted to choose a New Dealer ab ovo"'2 and got one, who, after
he went to the bench, was "the same man he was before he went
there."'"
Quite appropriately, the late Professor Daniel M. Berman of
American University, who wrote his Ph. D. thesis at Rutgers Univer-
sity on Justice Black and directed the publication of a symposium issue
of the American University Law Review 4 in honor of the Judge's 75th
birthday, writes chapter 3 on "The Persistent Race Issue." His is a
remarkably able and readable job that pulls no punches. Dan Ber-
man discusses Black's membership in the Ku Klux Klan' and says
that "[elven today he [Justice Black] asserts, only half-jokingly,
that the only organization he regrets joining is the American Bar
Association."' 6  Berman also discusses Black's recent votes in civil
rights cases and points out how both yesterday and today Hugo
Black does not allow personal attacks from the right or left to em-
bitter him because "he is the rare kind of person who genuinely
old.
10 J. FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN AND HIS OPINIONS (1949).
1 1 Frank, The New Court and the New Deal, in HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME
COURT 74 (S. Strickland ed. 1967).
12 Id.
13 Id.
'4 Symposium - Mr. Justice Black, 10 AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1961).
15 Berman, The Persistent Race Issue, in HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT
76-86 (S. Strickland ed. 1967).
16Id. at 289 n.34.
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respects the opinions of others - however intemperately ex-
pressed."'" His explanation of Justice Black's reason for voting
against Negro demonstrations in public libraries' and in front of
jails,"9 and Black's votes against sit-ins before the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,"0 and in favor of them thereafter, is su-
perbly done. With characteristic honesty, Berman concludes by
saying that "those who.., do not share Black's antipathy for the
techniques of direct action" should remember that in his "fifty years
in public life [Hugo Black] ... has seen other worthy goals doomed
by the very means employed to achieve them .... tand] [hie does
not want such a fate to befall the precious [and worthyl cause of
civil rights."
2
'
The well-known journalist, Professor Irving Dilliard o Prince-
ton, editor of books on Learned Hand and Hugo Black, writes chap-
ter 4 on "The Individual and the Bill of Absolute Rights." It is
too bad that he wrote before Black's dissent in Berger v. United
States,"2 but, nevertheless, Dilliard does correctly emphasize that
Black's dissent in Adamson v. California3 has carried the day, and
for all practical purposes the Bill of Rights that we fought two wars
to bring to the world has at long last been brought to the States.
In chapter 5, Professor Charles A. Reich of Yale, a former derk
for Justice Black, writes an analysis of Mr. Justice Black's constitu-
tional theory. He emphasizes Black's habit of beginning each deci-
sion with specific provisions of the Constitution and reasoning there-
from. To me the high point in Reich's piece is his comparison of
Black's decision on the rehearing in Reid v. Covert,24 where Black
reasons that clause 14 of section 8 of article I of the Constitution,
which gives the Congress the power to make uniform rules for the
land and naval services cannot apply to persons accompanying the
military with the status of civilians, and Mr. Justice Harlan's ap-
proach 5 that reads the clause the same way as to civilians accused
of capital crimes but the reverse way as to noncapital crimes.2"
17Id. at 86.
18 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 151 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
19 See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
21 Berman, supra note 15, at 95.
22 388 U.S. 41, 71 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
23 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
24 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
25 Id. at 65 (concurring opinion).
2 6 Reicb, The Living Constitution and the Court's Role, in HUGO BLACK ANxD THE
SUPREME CouRT 147-48 (S. Strickland ed. 1967).
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As chapter 6, the editor reprints the article that the late Ran-
dolph Paul wrote shortly before his untimely death about Justice
Black's tax decisions in 1956. Unfortunately, although he brackets
his new material, the editor attempts to bring the article up to date.
It does not need it.
In the tax field, Paul thinks Black's contribution greatest in his
decisions subjecting government employees - State and federal -
to federal taxation and his decision subjecting to taxation life estates
with power of appointment.2" It is a great tribute that so fine a tax
lawyer as Randolph Paul could say as early as 1956 that Hugo
Black's tax opinions maintain the "[high] standards of his other
work on the Court."28
In chapter 7, Associate Dean W. Wallace Kirkpatrick of the
George Washington Law School reviews Black's antitrust decisions.
I am afraid it is even less critical than this book review. Kirkpatrick
spent 20 years in the Antitrust Division and praises Black's every
decision. As much as I love Hugo, this I could not do. As Swisher
said: "from the perspective of coming generations of citizens andjudges the antitrust movement may come to be seen as a mark of
antiquity."2
9
George Kaufmann, of the District of Columbia bar, writes chap-
ter 8 on Black's attitude towards the Federal Rules - civil and
criminal. Strange as it may seem, he excuses Black's opposition to
the rules but objects to Black's violent opposition to cases where a
man is sent to jail because of his lawyer's neglect."0 I would come
to just the opposite conclusion.
In the last chapter, "Black on Balance," the editor, Stephen
Strickland, attempts a definitive critique. He fails but I give him
"A" for the effort. It is easily the most critical paper in the book.
Whether he is talking about Black's balancing the war power
against the first amendment as in Korematsu v. United States3 or
some other case, Strickland does not spare the horses. Unfortu-
nately, his piece lacks depth. For example, in his discussion of the
religious cases, Strickland omits Black's very important McCollum
27 Paul, Federal Taxation: Questions of Power and Propriety, in id. at 176-80.
28 Id. at 194.
29 Swisher, supra note 6, at 36.
30 Kaufmann, The Federal Civil Rules and the Pursuit of Justice, in HUGO BLACK
AND THE SUPREME COURT 221-44 (S. Strickland ed. 1967).
31 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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v. Board of Education3 2 opinion. The truth is, it is still too early to
give a definitive appraisal of Hugo Lafayette Black. He is still at
work and does not intend to quit in the near future. No book is
complete that does not deal with Black's decisions at the October
1967 Term. There he wrote approximately 11 opinions for the
Court, made 13 dissents, seven alone, not to mention five concurring
opinions. Professor Swisher please note.
This book falls short. As W.C. Fields was wont to say, any
fellow, even Hugo, so lavishly praised by these nine authors just
can't be all good. And if Madison had just a few of the faults Cross-
key attributes to him, except for New York Times v. Sullivan,3 it
would be libel per se for Strickland to call Justice Black a Madi-
sonian.
ARTHUR JOHN KEEFFE*
32 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
33 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
' Visiting Professor of Law. Case Western Reserve University.
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